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Trying to understand human language by constructing robots that have language necessarily 
implies an embodied view of language, where the meaning of linguistic expressions is derived 
from the physical interactions of the organism with the environment. The paper describes a 
neural model of language according to which the robot’s behaviour is controlled by a neural 
network composed of two sub-networks, one dedicated to the non-linguistic interactions of 
the robot with the environment and the other one to processing linguistic input and producing 
linguistic output. We present the results of a number of simulations using the model and we 
suggest how the model can be used to account for various language-related phenomena such 
as disambiguation, the metaphorical use of words, the pervasive idiomaticity of multi-word 
expressions, and mental life as talking to oneself. The model implies a view of the meaning of 
words and multi-word expressions as a temporal process that takes place in the entire brain 
and has no clearly defined boundaries. The model can also be extended to emotional words 
if we assume that an embodied view of language includes not only the interactions of the 
robot’s brain with the external environment but also the interactions of the brain with what is 
inside the body.
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Studying language by conStructing robotS that 
have language
If we want to construct human robots rather than just humanoid 
robots, that is, if we want to construct robots which actually behave 
like human beings rather than robots which only resemble human 
beings in their external morphology, it will be necessary for our 
robots to possess language because language is such a prominent 
feature of human beings. Some robots give us the impression of being 
able to use language but they do not actually understand the language 
they hear or produce. They are programmed to respond with specific 
actions to specific acoustic inputs and to generate specific sounds in 
specific circumstances but human language is much more than that. 
Of course, human language is a very complicated behavior and it 
will not be easy to construct robots that can be said to really possess 
language. But we can make some steps in that direction.
Studying language by constructing robots that have language 
implies a specific conceptual framework with which to look at 
human language. Robots are real or simulated physical artifacts. 
They have a body, they have sensors and effectors with which they 
interact with the physical environment, their behavior is con-
trolled by a simulated “brain” (an artificial neural network), and 
their body contains (or should contain; cf. Parisi, 2004) not only 
a “brain” but also other internal organs and systems. Therefore, 
robots necessarily imply an “embodied” conception of cognition 
according to which cognition depends on, and is shaped by, the 
possession of a body and the movements of the body’s different 
parts. Cognitive representations have been traditionally thought 
of as based on perception or as abstract representations that do 
not contain sensory-motor information. However, recent empirical 
findings and theoretical developments favor a different conception 
of cognitive representations according to which the body of the 
organism and the movements of the body’s effectors play a critical 
role in shaping the organism’s cognitive representations (Gibson, 
1979; Clark, 1999; Barsalou, 2008a,b). Furthermore, if the robot’s 
behavior is controlled by a neural network (as it should be since 
the brain is part of the body and, to be consistent, robots should be 
neurorobots), cognitive representations become neural representa-
tions, that is, patterns of activation or successions of patterns of 
activation in a set of units that simulate the brain’s neurons. This 
usefully operationalizes the rather vague concept of cognitive or 
mental representation since, unlike cognitive or mental representa-
tions, artificial neural representations can be observed, measured, 
and compared with empirical data on the brain.
Constructing robots that have language necessarily extends the 
embodied conception of cognition to language. Empirical evidence 
in favor of an embodied conception of cognition has accumu-
lated not only in experiments in which participants respond to the 
sight of objects but also when they respond to words that refer to 
those objects (for a recent review, see Fischer and Zwaan, 2008). In 
both cases, the sensory input activates the neural representation of 
the action with which participants usually respond to the object. 
However, a well-developed embodied theory of language should 
be able to answer many questions that remain still open, and con-
structing robots that have language should help us to answer these 
questions. Here are some examples. Are there differences in what 
happens in the brain when a participant responds to the sight of 
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circular object, again independently of the object’s color, we find 
that the four objects are represented in the internal units of the 
robot’s neural network in terms of the action that the robot has to 
do in response to the objects (go to the button on the right, go to 
the button on the left) rather than in terms of the perceptual prop-
erties of the objects as such. In fact we observe only two activation 
patterns in the neural network’s internal units, one which controls 
the action of reaching the button on the right and the other one 
which controls the action of reaching the button on the left. The 
object’s perceptual property which is critical to decide which action 
to do, in our case shape, determines the internal representation of 
the object, while the other property, color, is ignored. Notice that 
the internal representation of an action is abstract in the sense that 
it needs to be translated into a succession of specific movements of 
the robot’s arm which vary as a function of the starting position of 
the arm. In fact, the robot’s neural network includes an additional 
set of proprioceptive input units encoding the current position of 
the robot’s arm which project directly to the motor units. The two 
activation patterns that constitute the internal representations of 
the two actions interact with this proprioceptive information from 
the arm so that, for any starting position of the arm, each of the two 
abstractly represented action can be translated in the appropriate 
succession of movements.
a neural network’S architecture for 
language‑uSing robotS
The robots we have described in the preceding Section do not have 
language but they only respond to objects with the appropriate 
non-linguistic action. We now ask: What is the basic architecture of 
the neural network that controls the behavior of a language-using 
robot? The robot’s overall neural network is made up of two sub-
networks, the non-linguistic sub-network (NL) and the linguistic 
sub-network (L) (Mirolli and Parisi, 2005). Both sub-networks 
include three layers of units: a sensory layer, a motor layer, and 
an intermediate layer of internal units. The sensory units of NL 
encode perceived objects and its motor units encode movements 
of the robot’s effectors such as the robot’s arm. The sensory units 
of L encode heard linguistic sounds and its motor units encode 
movements of the robot’s phono-articulatory organs that result 
in the production of linguistic sounds. NL maps non-linguistic 
sensory input into non-linguistic actions. In fact, NL is identical 
to the neural network of our robots that had to reach with their 
arm one of two different buttons in response to a visually perceived 
object. L maps heard linguistic sounds into phono-articulatory 
movements. This is the network that controls the behavior of a 
robot which is able to imitate (repeat) heard sounds without asso-
ciating any meaning to them. The robot hears a linguistic sound 
and it responds with movements of its phono-articulatory organs 
that reproduce the sound.
The two sub-networks remain functionally or perhaps even ana-
tomically separate during an initial period of the robot’s existence 
which corresponds to children’s first year of life. During this period 
the robot learns to respond to non-linguistic sensory input (say, 
perceived objects) with movements of its non-linguistic effectors 
(arm, hands, legs, eyes) using its NL sub-network. In addition the 
robot uses its L sub-network to produce linguistic sounds with its 
phono-articulatory organs, either spontaneously or in response 
an object and when he/she responds to a word which refers to the 
object? Do nouns evoke what are called the stable affordances of 
an object, i.e., the action with which one responds to the object 
and which is represented in the brain independently of the actual 
movements with which the action is physically realized in different 
circumstances, while seeing an object in a particular orientation 
also evokes the variable affordances of the object which specify at 
least some aspects of the movements one has to produce to physi-
cally realize the action (Borghi and Riggio, 2009)? Do verbs that 
refer to actions only or mainly activate the neural representation of 
the state of the environment which is produced by the movements 
of the effectors, i.e., the effect of the action, while the sight of an 
action activates a neural representation of both this state and the 
movements of the effectors that will produce it? Does possession 
of a language change how the brain responds to perceived objects 
and actions in that an individual tend to internally label those 
objects and actions and therefore he or she responds to both the 
perceived object and action and the self-produced linguistic signal? 
Are there differences between the neural representations evoked 
by verbs and by nouns, or by nouns that refer to tools (e.g., ham-
mer) and nouns that refer to natural objects (tree) (Cangelosi and 
Parisi, 2001)? How can an embodied theory of language account 
for abstract words? Do abstract words imply going back and forth 
between the part of the brain that processes words as sounds and 
the part which constructs a meaning for the sound, while this is 
less true for concrete words? How is an embodied meaning for 
combinations of words (phrases and sentences) constructed? How 
can an embodied theory account for emotional words and for the 
emotional component of non-emotional words?
In this paper we describe a simple neural network architecture 
for language-using simulated robots living in simulated environ-
ments and we try to show how this architecture may explain a 
(very limited) number of linguistic behaviors, where to explain a 
behavior is to construct a robot that reproduces the behavior. We 
will refer to robots that have been actually constructed and we will 
indicate how these robots could be modified to account for other 
linguistic phenomena.
objectS are internally repreSented in termS of the 
actionS with which we reSpond to them
Neurorobots  develop  internal  (neural)  representations  of  per-
ceived objects which are based on the motor actions with which 
they respond to the objects rather than on the objects’ perceptual 
  properties. Imagine a robot whose neural network has sensory units 
encoding the visual properties of objects, motor units encoding 
the movements of the robot’s arm, and an intermediate layer of 
internal units. The robot lives in an environment in which it may 
be exposed to one of four possible objects possessing two proper-
ties, color and shape, both with two values, blue and red, square 
and circle. The robot sees one object at a time and it has to respond 
by reaching with its arm one of two buttons, one on the right and 
the other on the left (Borghi et al., 2003, 2005; Di Ferdinando and 
Parisi, 2004). (The connection weights of the neural network of 
all the robots described in this paper are evolved using a genetic 
algorithm. See Mitchell, 1998). If the button on the right has to 
be reached when the robot sees a square object, independently of 
the object’s color, and the button on the left when the robot sees a Parisi  Robots and language
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reaching perceptually different edible mushrooms) and a variety 
of different objects which have to be responded to with another 
action (avoiding perceptually different poisonous mushrooms) 
(Cangelosi and Parisi, 1998). In these circumstances, we cannot 
expect that all the mushrooms that have to be responded to with 
the same action will evoke an identical activation pattern in the 
internal units of the robot’s neural network, completely eliminating 
the differences among the individual mushrooms that have to be 
responded to with the same action. In fact, if we evolve a population 
of robots in this new environment and we examine the activation 
patterns elicited by the mushrooms in the internal units of the 
robot’s neural network, we find that even perceptually different 
mushrooms that have to be responded to with the same action 
tend to elicit somewhat different activation patterns in the internal 
units. However, we can still maintain the basic assumption of the 
action-based conception of cognition, i.e., that different objects 
tend to be internally represented on the basis of the action with 
which they have to be responded to, rather than in terms of their 
purely perceptual characteristics. When the robots have (evolu-
tionarily) learned to respond appropriately to the mushrooms, i.e., 
they eat the edible ones and avoid the poisonous ones, we discover 
that the mushrooms of one category do not evoke exactly the same 
internal activation pattern in the internal units of the robots’ neu-
ral network. However, the internal activation patterns evoked by 
the mushrooms belonging to one action-defined category resem-
ble each other and are very different from the activation patterns 
evoked by the mushrooms belonging to the other category. The 
two categories of mushrooms can be formally represented as two 
“clouds” of points in the abstract hyperspace of the internal units, 
where each point represents the internal activation pattern of an 
individual mushroom, each dimension of the space corresponds 
to one internal unit, and the position of the point on that dimen-
sion corresponds to the activation level of the unit. The points that 
correspond to one category of mushrooms form one cloud, and 
they are close to one another, and the points corresponding to the 
other category form another, separate, cloud.
What if when the robot encounters a mushroom, it does not 
only visually perceive the mushroom but it also hears the word that 
describes the category of the mushroom, for example the words 
“edible” and “poisonous”? Now the neural network that controls 
the robot’s behavior includes both a NL sub-network and L sub-
network. When the robot encounters an edible mushroom and it 
visually perceives the mushroom with its NL sub-network, it also 
hears the sound “edible” with its L sub-network, while when it 
encounters a poisonous mushroom it hears the sound “poisonous”. 
(Notice that these two sounds can be produced by another robot 
or they can be self-produced by the robot. For the self-production 
of language as an important component of what we can call a 
robot’s mental life, see Section “Robot That Talk to Themselves”). 
If we examine the clouds of points representing the two categories 
of mushrooms in the internal units of a robot’s NL sub-network, 
we find that, compared to the robots without language, the two 
clouds have a smaller size and there in a greater distance between 
the centers of the two clouds. As a consequence, we find that the 
robots are better able to distinguish between the two categories 
of mushrooms and to avoid making errors by eating a poisonous 
mushroom or avoiding an edible mushroom (Mirolli and Parisi, 
of its own heard sounds (babbling) and, later on, by imitating the 
linguistic sounds produced by already speaking robots.
At the end of this period the two sub-networks begin to be con-
nected together by two-way connections that go from the internal 
units of NL to the internal units of L, and vice versa, and the syn-
aptic weights of these two-way connections are learned based on 
the co-variation of specific linguistic sounds with specific objects 
and actions in the robot’s experience. From this point on our robot 
becomes a language-using robot. The robot still uses NL to produce 
non-linguistic actions in response to non-linguistic sensory input 
but, in addition, it begins to understand and to produce language. 
Language understanding consists in responding to heard linguis-
tic sounds with the appropriate movements of the non-linguistic 
effectors while language production consists in responding to non-
  linguistic input with phono-articulatory movements that produce 
the appropriate linguistic sounds. In language understanding neu-
ral activation spreads from the sensory layer of L (heard words) to 
the internal units of L and from there to the internal units and to the 
motor layer of NL (non-linguistic actions). In language production 
activation spreads from the sensory layer of NL (perceived objects 
and actions) to the internal units of NL and from there to the inter-
nal units and to the motor layer of L (phono-articulatory move-
ments that produce words). (We are talking here of overt responses 
to sensory input but activation can stop at the internal layer of the 
two sub-networks, where non-linguistic and linguistic actions are 
neurally represented, without producing overt responses, that is, 
without translating these actions into actual physical movements 
of either the non-linguistic or linguistic effectors).
influence of language on the robot’S categorieS
The network architecture described in the preceding Section allows 
us to (begin to) answer the question of what are the consequences 
of possessing a language for a robot’s cognition, that is, for the 
functioning of the robot’s NL sub-network. More specifically, in 
this Section we will see what are the consequences of possessing a 
language for the robot’s categories.
As we have seen in Section “Objects are Internally Represented 
in Terms of the Actions with Which We Respond to Them”, per-
ceived objects that have to be responded to with the same action 
elicit an identical activation pattern in the network’s internal units 
even if they are perceptually different, while perceived objects that 
have to be responded to with different actions elicit different activa-
tion patterns in the internal units. This is the basis for defining an 
  action-based notion of categories. A category is an internal activation 
pattern elicited by different objects that have to be responded to with 
the same action. For the robots of Section “Objects are Internally 
Represented in Terms of the Actions with Which We Respond to 
Them”, two objects with different color elicit the same activation 
pattern in the robot’s internal units if they have to be responded to 
with the same action. Hence, for those robots square objects form 
one category and circular object form another category.
In the robots we have described categories correspond to a sin-
gle activation pattern in the robot’s internal units. As we consider 
more complex environments, however, we have to qualify this claim. 
Imagine a mobile (and armless) robot living in an environment 
that contains a large variety of perceptually different objects that 
have to be responded to with the same action (say, approaching and Parisi  Robots and language
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and the other one which specifies the action of grasping small edible 
mushrooms with a precision grip or the action of grasping large 
edible mushrooms with a power grip.
These robots would make it possible to ask some interesting 
questions  about  the  neural  representation  of  language. As  we 
know, the internal units of L are bi-directionally connected with 
the internal units of NL. But now NL has two layers of internal 
units, one specifying the actions of approaching and reaching the 
edible mushrooms and avoiding the poisonous ones, and the other 
one specifying the actions of producing a precision grip of the 
hand for small edible mushrooms and a power grip for large edible 
mushrooms. With which of these two different internal layers of 
NL will the internal layer of L be bi-directionally connected? Would 
the internal layer of L be bi-directionally connected with both the 
first and the second internal layers of NL, or would it be preferen-
tially connected with the more perceptually abstract second layer? 
Notice that the answer to this question might depend on the robots’ 
language. Small and large edible mushrooms might co-vary with 
two different sounds, i.e., two different nouns, that is, there might 
be one sound (name) for small edible mushrooms and a different 
sound (a different name) for large edible mushrooms. Or the robots’ 
language might include a sound which co-varies with both small 
and large edible mushrooms and two other sounds which co-vary, 
respectively, with small and large mushrooms (and probably with 
other things that require a precision or a power grip). This would 
make it possible to being to recognize different types of words in 
our robots’ language (say, nouns and adjectives).
a more SophiSticated model of the internal layer of 
both the nl and n Sub‑networkS
We have assumed so far that external input, from within the net-
work or from the outside environment, evokes one single pattern 
of activation in the internal units of NL and L. But let us change the 
model and imagine that the internal units of both NL and L have 
internal (horizontal) connections that allow one activation pattern 
to elicit another activation pattern in the same set of units. In this 
manner, an external input will evoke not a single (static) activation 
pattern but a succession of activation patterns in the internal units 
of both NL and L. This is just one particular instance of a general 
property of brain activity which is not well captured in most neural 
network models: brain activity is made up of continuous processes, 
not states. Time is a crucial property of brain activity but it is not 
well captured by neural network models that conceive network 
activity as a succession of discrete time cycles. Objects and words 
should elicit processes in a neural network which at some point 
or another cause a response in the network’s motor units, and this 
response will in turn cause other processes in the neural network. 
(We do not address here how this could be implemented in our 
language-using robots).
This new type of neural network for our language-using robots 
may help us explain one type of word associations, i.e., word-word 
associations. The sound of a word, represented as an action of the 
phono-articulatory effectors of the robot in the internal units of 
L, will evoke the sound of another word in the same internal units 
of L. Another type of word associations, based on the meaning of 
words and not just on their sound, can be reproduced with our 
robots if an activation pattern in the L internal units evokes an 
2005). The linguistic labeling of categories of objects makes these 
categories better able to support effective behavior. This appears 
to be an important consequence of possessing a language and may 
have had a crucial role in its evolutionary emergence.
Notice that in many neural network models of “semantic knowl-
edge” (e.g., Rogers and McClelland, 2004), word meanings are iden-
tified with categories or concepts and therefore it is in principle 
impossible to ask the question of what might be the influence of 
language on categories. The neural network of our language-using 
robots is made up of two parts, one which is non-linguistic and the 
other one which is linguistic, and categories emerge in the non-
linguistic part as a consequence of the non-linguistic interactions 
of the robot with the non-linguistic environment. Only when the 
linguistic part becomes operational (in children at around 1 year 
of age) one may pose the question of what are the consequences 
of possessing a language for the non-linguistic functioning of 
the organism.
the emergence of different typeS of wordS in the 
robotS’ language
In the robots described so far the NL sub-network has a single layer 
of internal units that receive activation from the sensory units and 
send activation to the motor units, and we have seen that the pat-
tern of activation appearing in the NL internal units encodes the 
action with which the robot has to respond to the sensory input and 
ignores the properties of the sensory input which are not relevant 
to decide the action. The edible mushrooms are all different from 
each other but this variation tends to be ignored (or minimized) 
by the internal units because all edible mushrooms, independently 
of their differences, have to be responded to with the same action: 
approaching and reaching the mushroom. What if NL has not one 
but two successive layers of internal units, with the sensory units 
sending their activation to the first layer, this layer sending its activa-
tion to the second layer, and the second layer sending its activation 
to the motor units? If we construct a robot with this type of NL, 
we find that, while the second layer of internal units specifies the 
action to be executed and ignores the properties of the perceived 
object which are irrelevant for the action (like in our robots with a 
single layer of units), the first layer of internal units preserve more 
of the properties of the perceived object, even if they appear not 
to be relevant for the action (Borghi et al., 2003).
Why might it be useful for our robots to have two layers of 
internal units and not only one? The robots described so far have 
only to approach and reach the edible mushrooms in order to eat 
them. But imagine another robot which has an arm and a hand and 
which to eat an edible mushroom has first to grasp the mushroom 
with its hand. The robots lives in an environment in which the 
edible mushrooms are of two sizes: small and large. The robot has 
to approach and reach both small and large mushrooms but then 
it has to grasp the mushrooms with its hand in order to bring them 
to the mouth. There are two actions of grasping. To grasp small 
mushrooms the robot has to produce a precision grip by using the 
thumb and index finger of its hand while to grasp large mushrooms 
the action has to be a power grip which uses all the fingers of the 
hand. This robot would find it useful to have two layers of internal 
units, one which specifies the action of approaching and reaching 
edible mushrooms or the action of avoiding poisonous mushrooms Parisi  Robots and language
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word “water”, which is not normally considered to be an ambi-
guous word, may elicit different activation patterns in the NL 
sub-network as a function of the particular context in which 
the word is used. This may be extended to the metaphorical 
use of words and to words that have both a literal meaning and 
a metaphorical meaning, such as the verb “to grasp”.
(c) All multi-word expressions are idiomatic
  Not only there is no clear separation between ambiguous words 
and non-ambiguous words but there is no clear separation 
between idiomatic expressions and non-idiomatic expressions. 
Idioms are defined as multi-word expressions whose meaning 
cannot be derived from the meanings of the component words 
(Cacciari and Tabossi, 1993). Idiomatic expressions are consi-
dered as different from non-idiomatic expressions in that non-
idiomatic expressions are sequences of words which elicit an 
overall pattern of activation in the NL sub-network which is 
made up of the activation patterns elicited by the words that 
make up the sequence (phrase or sentence) according to some 
general rules (syntax). We claim that all multiple-word expres-
sions, when they are actually used, are to some extent idioma-
tic, that is, they elicit an activation pattern in the NL internal 
units is something more than, and more specific, than the sum 
of the component words. (This applies even to what appear 
to  be  the  simplest  multi-word  expressions,  i.e.,  verb-noun 
expressions). Our model can provide an explanation both for 
idioms and for the fact that all multi-word expressions possess 
some degree of idiomaticity (Wray, 2002). The model should 
explain these different degrees (and types; cf. Wray, 2002) of 
idiomaticity because the overall activation pattern which is 
activated in the internal units of the NL sub-network when the 
robot arrives to the end of the sequence of heard words may be 
related to the activation patterns elicited by the single words of 
the sequence in a variety of different and unique ways.
robot that talk to themSelveS
The neural network of our language-using robots allows us to 
(begin to) explain an important aspect of mental life, that is, 
mental life as talking to oneself (Parisi, 2007). The simple network 
architecture described in Section “A Neural Network’s Architecture 
for Language-Using Robots” appears to be generally appropriate 
to capture how language can influence cognition, providing the 
basis for a Vygotskyan robotics (Mirolli and Parisi, 2009, 2010). 
But if we assume that the internal units of the robots’ neural 
network have horizontal connections and these connections can 
produce a succession of activation patterns in both the NL and L 
internal units, we can see how the reciprocal connections linking 
the NL and L internal units can explain mental life as talking to 
oneself. We have seen the role of these reciprocal connections in 
explaining language understanding and language production. But 
when a non-linguistic input arrives to the sensory units of NL, 
for example the robot sees a cat, and the activation spreads to 
the internal units of NL and then to the internal units of L, two 
different things can happen. One is that the activation reaches 
the motor units of L and the robots pronounces the word “cat”. 
The other is that the activation pattern in the internal units of 
L elicits another activation pattern in the same set of units, for 
activation pattern in the NL internal units which evokes a second 
activation pattern in the same NL internal units which in turn 
evokes an activation pattern in the L internal units. The first type 
of word associations requires a succession of activation patterns 
within the L internal units while this second type requires going 
back and forth between the internal layers of L and NL.
This more sophisticated (and, we believe, more realistic) neural 
network model may lead to a number of interesting conclusions 
concerning the nature of language, with particular reference to 
three issues: (a) how the meaning of words is represented in the 
brain; (b) the ambiguity of all words (and not only of ambiguous 
words); and (c) the idiomatic character of all multi-word expres-
sions (and not only idiomatic expressions). Let us consider these 
three issues.
(a) There is no such thing as the meaning of a word in the brain
  If an activation pattern in the L internal units evokes an acti-
vation pattern in the NL internal units which in turn evokes 
another activation pattern in the same NL internal units, and 
so on, one is led to the conclusion that there is nothing like the 
meaning of a word in the brain. Heard words are specific entry 
points to the NL sub-network but they elicit in the NL sub-
network not a single activation pattern but a succession of acti-
vation patterns in many possible directions as a function of the 
current context and many other factors, and it is difficult to say 
where the process ends. The existence of a “semantic module” 
is assumed in many symbolic models and in many traditio-
nal, i.e., non-embodied, neural network models of language. 
But in the neural network that controls the behavior of our 
language-using robots there is no special “semantic module” 
which contains the “meanings” of words. The NL sub-network 
is the “rest of the brain” which is activated in many possible 
directions when one hears a word. Words do not have well-
defined meanings but they are just entry points for activating 
the entire brain.
(b) All words are ambiguous
  The more sophisticated neural network of our language-using 
robots should help us to explain the role of context in language 
understanding. We define context as any additional input, lin-
guistic or non-linguistic, arriving from outside the brain or 
self-generated inside the brain, that may influence what acti-
vation patterns are sequentially elicited in the internal units 
of the NL sub-network. Among other things, context explains 
how the brain disambiguates ambiguous words. The context 
is an additional input that directs the activation process in the 
NL internal units in one direction or another. The ambiguous 
word “club” activates one activation pattern in the internal 
units of the NL sub-network in the context of golf and ano-
ther activation pattern in the context of the social behavior of 
some people.
  What is more interesting is that our model can explain the less 
well-recognized fact that all words are to some extent ambi-
guous and there is no clear dividing line between ambiguous 
and non-ambiguous words. For all words, the context in which 
a word is used directs the understanding of the word, i.e., the 
succession of activation patterns in the internal units of the 
NL sub-network, in one or another direction. For example the Parisi  Robots and language
Frontiers in Neurorobotics  www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 10  |  6
As we have said at the beginning of the paper, robots indicate 
the importance of the body and its movements in determining 
cognition so that robotics naturally converges with theories of 
cognition as embodied and as action-based. But both current 
robots and these theories have two related limitations that need 
to be overcome if we want to construct a more complete theory 
of the human mind. The first limitation is due to the fact that an 
organism’s body does not only have an external morphology and 
sensory and motor organs but it also includes internal organs 
and systems which exist inside the body beyond the brain. The 
second limitation is that the mind is not only cognition but also 
motivation and emotion. The two limitations are related because 
while cognition mainly results from the interactions of the brain 
with the external environment, motivations and emotions mainly 
result from the interactions of the brain with the other organs and 
systems that exist inside the body.
An embodied conception of the entire mind (not just cogni-
tion) assumes two levels of functioning of the behavioral system 
of an animal, a strategic or motivational level and a tactical or 
cognitive level. All animals have many different motivations that 
are generally impossible to satisfy at the same time. Therefore these 
different motivations necessarily compete with one another for the 
control of the animal’s behavior and at any given time the strategic 
level of functioning of the animal has to decide which motivation 
the animal should pursue with its behavior. The decision is taken 
on the basis of the current intensity of the different motivations, 
which is determined by many different factors, both intrinsic (the 
overall adaptive pattern of the animal and the specific environment 
in which the animal lives) and contextual (sensory input from the 
body and from the external environment). Once a decision is taken 
at the strategic level, the cognitive level executes the activity which 
will hopefully satisfy the motivation decided at the strategic level. 
Emotions operate at the strategic or motivational level by increas-
ing the current intensity of one or another motivation so that the 
strategic level may function more effectively (fewer errors, faster 
decisions, increasing the persistence of important motivations, 
etc.). The tactical level is mostly implemented through the interac-
tions of the animal’s brain with the external environment, while 
the strategic level is mostly implemented through the interactions 
of the brain with what is inside the body. If robots should help 
us to develop a complete embodied theory of the mind, what is 
needed is an internal robotics, that is, the construction of robots 
that do not have only the external morphology of an animal’s 
body and a “brain” which interacts only with the external environ-
ment but also have internal (artificial) organs and systems and a 
“brain” which interacts with these internal organs and systems 
(Parisi, 2004).
How are this more complete conception of the mind and this 
more complete robotics related to the construction of robots that 
have language? Not only so-called emotional words but all words 
have an emotional component that plays a role in their use and, 
unless we are able to endow the words used by a robot with this 
emotional component, we are not authorized to say that we have 
constructed robots that have language.
How should we proceed? The first step is to construct robots 
that have many different motivations and have to choose which 
example the activation pattern corresponding to word “dog”. This 
activation pattern in turn will elicit in the internal units of NL the 
activation pattern (or rather the succession of activation patterns) 
that gives a meaning to the word “dog”. This is already talking 
to oneself. The robots hears the self-produced word “dog” and 
understands the word. But what is interesting is that the process 
can go back and forth between NL and L. An activation pattern 
in the internal units of NL can elicit another activation pattern 
in the same units and this other activation pattern can elicit an 
activation pattern in the internal units of L. The process can go 
on an indefinite number of times, as when one is immersed in 
his or her thoughts.
Talking to oneself really takes off when the process of going back 
and forth between the L and NL internal units interacts with the 
process of generating a succession of activation patterns in many 
possible directions in the NL internal units. The result of the inter-
action between these two processes is that the activation patterns 
evoked in the L internal units (words) influence and control the 
succession of activation pattern evoked in the NL units. This is an 
important component of talking to oneself as thinking.
language production deteriorateS more than 
language underStanding with age
A robot that has language must also be able to exhibit the rich 
phenomenology of pathological linguistic behaviors. By lesion-
ing in different places and in different ways the neural network 
that controls both the non-linguistic and the linguistic behavior 
of the robot, we should be able to reproduce a variety of linguistic 
disorders. We will only mention here a phenomenon which is not 
considered as really pathological but still involves some malfunc-
tioning of language. With old age many people find it difficult to 
find the word that expresses something they appear to have in 
their mind. This difficulty in producing the word is not normally 
accompanied by a parallel difficulty in understanding the word. 
Our model of language might be able to reproduce this asymme-
try if we assume that in old age there is a gradual but diffuse loss 
of neurons or of connections between neurons. The model can 
explain both facts if we make the very reasonable assumption that 
the internal layer of the NL sub-network contains many more units 
(neurons) than the internal layer of the L sub-network. If there is 
a diffuse loss of units or of connections between units (includ-
ing the two-way connections between the two layers of units) it 
might be easier for the network to go from a pattern of activation 
in the L sub-network (internal representation of the heard word) 
to the appropriate   pattern of activation in the NL sub-network 
(  understanding the word) than to go from a pattern of activation 
in the NL sub-network to the appropriate pattern of activation in 
the L sub-network (finding the word to express something one has 
in mind) simply because the larger sub-network is more robust 
than the smaller sub-network (Mirolli et al., 2007).
the emotional meaning of wordS
Words do not only have a cognitive or informational meaning but 
they also have an emotional meaning. Can the neural network of 
our language-using robots be modified so that our robots might 
be able to appreciate the emotional meaning of words?Parisi  Robots and language
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one manner or other and to a greater or smaller degree activate 
the circuit. Adding an emotional circuit to the NL sub-network of 
our language-using robots will be necessary if the motivational/
emotional level of behavior of our robots should be influenced by 
hearing both words produced by other robots and self-produced 
words. If we further assume that exercising our emotions in safe 
conditions such as those implied in exposing oneself to artistic 
artifacts  leads  to  a  more  sophisticated  motivational/emotional 
functioning, our emotional language-using robots might also be 
able to understand and enjoy poetry and other forms of verbal art 
as humans do. Poems and novels are verbal stimuli that to be really 
understood and enjoyed should activate the emotional circuit of 
the NL sub-network of our language-using robots.
concluSion
A crucial step toward the construction of really human, and not 
simply humanoid, robots is to construct robots that have language. 
In this paper we have described a simple neural network archi-
tecture that controls the behavior of a language-using robot and 
we have illustrated a number of language-related phenomena that 
can be explained (reproduced) with our language-using robot. 
However, most of the work to construct robots that can be said to 
have language has still to be done since human language is such a 
complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Language has emerged 
from animal-like non-linguistic communication systems, is cultur-
ally transmitted, and it changes historically. Language is learned 
through a succession of specific stages. Linguistic expressions are 
made up of simpler expressions, from morphemes to words, from 
phrases to sentences. Language is a crucial ingredient of human 
social life and it is used to accomplish a large number of differ-
ent social goals. We think that all these aspects of language which 
are studied by a variety of scientific disciplines might be illumi-
nated by a well-developed linguistic robotics. (For a description 
of the different goals of such a linguistic robotics, see Parisi and 
Cangelosi, 2002).
one of these different motivations will control the robot’s behav-
ior at any given time. Current robots tend to have just one single 
motivation, and this motivation is not chosen by them but by 
their users, that is, by us. The second step is to endow our robots 
with emotions (not just with the capacity to express emotions that 
they do not actually have, as in most current “emotional” robots). 
This can be done by adding an “emotional circuit” to the neural 
network that controls the robot’s behavior, where the function of 
this emotional circuit is to enable the robot to make more effective 
and more efficient motivational choices. The emotional (neural) 
circuit can be activated by input from the body (e.g., hunger or 
thirst) or from the external environment (e.g., a predator or a 
possible mate) and it sends activation to the rest of the robot’s 
neural network, influencing the motivational decision taken by 
the neural network and therefore the actual behavior exhibited 
by the robot. The emotional circuit also interacts with the rest 
of the robot’s body, sending and receiving activation to and from 
internal organs (e.g., heart and gut) and systems (e.g., endocrine 
and immunological systems).
The first steps in this direction have already been made by con-
structing robots that to survive and reproduce have to both eat 
and drink, or to both eat and avoid being killed by a predator, or to 
both eat and approach a mate. The results indicate that in all cases 
adding an emotional circuit to the neural network that controls the 
robot’s behavior leads to more effective behaviors and, therefore, 
to longer lives and more offspring. (For a detailed description of 
these robots, see Parisi and Petrosino, in press).
How can we extend our model of language-using robots so that 
our robots can understand and produce words that have an emo-
tional component? The answer is to add an emotional circuit to 
the NL sub-network of our robots so that the emotional circuit 
can also be activated when the robot understands or produces a 
word. The use (understanding and production) of some words 
will more directly and more extensively involve the activation of 
the emotional circuit of the NL sub-network but all words will in Parisi  Robots and language
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